Indian intelligence has had a litany of failures in recent years, the most notable of which were the undetected Pakistani intrusion into Kargil and the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. In April 1999, the Indian Army was taken unawares as it did not know about the presence of intruders in Kargil. Even when it got wind of it, until mid-May it didn’t know of their identity and actual numbers.
A US study group, the Center for Contemporary Conflict, funded by the Pentagon, had in the aftermath of that pointed out that there was no legal, constitutional or legislative control of intelligence in India, and Indian intelligence agencies were working at cross-purposes, without any visible signs of coordination. The report of the group added that due to the lack of coordination between the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) and Intelligence Bureau (IB), Indian policy-makers often lacked the complete picture of the nation’s security. The report had also opined that no political party had ever shown inclination to make intelligence agencies transparent or accountable to the executive as well as the taxpayers through Parliament.
That these problems persist to this day is a testimony to how little we learn from our mistakes and how we tend to ignore the right signals. Thirteen years after Kargil and three and a half years after 26/11, we are still learning those lessons all over again, having ignored sane counsel at that time.
A report sponsored by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) on revamping the intelligence set-up released last month is currently going through the process of discussions. The report includes recommendations such as improved interaction among civilian and military intelligence agencies and a role for the legislature in overseeing the country’s intelligence apparatus, familiarly close to what were the talking points in the aftermath of Kargil back in 1999.
Most experts believe that coordination between a plethora of agencies is the key. There is the IB that reports to the Union home minister; the R&AW that reports to the prime minister; there are organisations such as Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), Aviation Research Centre (ARC) and the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) that report to the National Security Council. The armed forces have their own intelligence agencies, one each under the army, navy and air force and an umbrella body called the National Intelligence Agency. There are other agencies that specialise in financial intelligence. These are the directorates in the income tax, customs and central excise departments. In addition, there are a number of state intelligence agencies and special cells, all devoted to the same cause.
Union home minister P Chidambaram admitted the lack of coordination among various departments when he delivered the Intelligence Bureau Centenary Endowment Lecture in 2009. “There is a need to network all data bases that contain vital information and intelligence. Today each data base stands alone. It does not talk to another data base. Nor can the ‘owner’ of one data base access another database....,” he pointed out. That nothing substantial has been done even by those who are in a position to make a difference is borne out by facts today.
In an incisive paper a former joint director of the Intelligence Bureau, Maloy Kumar Dhar wrote in 2006 that the IB had very little support from sister agencies like the R&AW in regard to location, preparation and planning of the jihadist hideouts in Pakistan, Bangladesh and other countries. He wrote: ‘We fail because our coastal policing and intelligence gathering mechanism is appallingly poor. Besides the Coast Guard, which normally patrols the deeper shallow waters, and the Border Security Force, which covers certain eastern riverine borders with Bangladesh, the state governments do not take coastal policing seriously. The existing police forces are not adequate, trained and equipped to police the vast western coastal area.... Besides over a dozen major ports, the western coast has nearly 150 minor ports, over 200 landing sites and over 500 shallow landing creeks. The police and customs presence in the major ports aside, there is skeletal or no customs or police presence in minor ports and nothing at all in the landing sites and shallow creeks.... Pakistan and other jihadist forces can land any amount of arms and explosives through the vast unmanned western coastal area. India has no blueprint to tackle this menace.’ This proved prophetic when terrorists struck Mumbai via the sea in 2008. There was for some time an expression of desire to set things right but not much has changed since then.
Says the IDSA task force in its June 5 report to the government: ‘Several efforts have been made in the past to bring about reforms in the intelligence sector. Our contention in this report is that these efforts have been piecemeal and ad hoc. New organisations were created but no thought was given to prevent overlaps of jurisdiction or turf wars on the creation or sharing of expensive new technical assets or know-how.’
The problem of coordination is not just between the civil and military intelligence. The information and operations sharing mechanism between the Centre and the states is still in rudimentary stage. The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) conceived as a nodal agency for coordinating all anti-terrorism activities has proved stillborn with the opposition playing politics on it and the government unwilling to accommodate some of its genuine concerns.
The IB also is groping for reforms. It deserves to be strengthened. It needs to have superfast computers to monitor web sites of well-equipped terror outfits. Only sustained studies and research can decipher the coding pattern and transmission trademark of each terror group.
A task force appointed by the PM to look into national security has recently given its report wherein it has asked for the appointment of an ‘Intelligence Adviser’ to assist the national security adviser, and a National Intelligence Board to coordinate intelligence at the highest levels.
Yet, all said and done it is not committees and task forces or think-tanks that we have been found wanting in. It is action on the ground that has been lacking. It is time we realised that mere lip service to intelligence reforms will not lead us anywhere. What is vital is swift and decisive implementation of some of the worthy ideas that are in the pipeline. It is never right to underestimate the threat from across the borders.
Kamlendra Kanwar is a veteran journalist and author. E-mail: k.kamlendra@gmail.com