The recurring friction between governors and elected state governments is no longer an episodic irritant but a persistent constitutional fault line in Indian democracy. Rooted in the ambiguous scope of Article 163 and repeatedly tested before the Supreme Court, this conflict has cycled through legislatures, Raj Bhavans and courtrooms without yielding a durable resolution. What has emerged instead are constitutional ceasefires rather than settlements. Recent episodes in three southern states add another chapter to this long-running dispute.
In Kerala, Governor Rajendra Arlekar amended and omitted portions of the policy address cleared by the cabinet, prompting Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan to read the deleted sections himself. On the same day in Tamil Nadu, Governor R N Ravi declined to deliver his customary address and walked out of the Assembly, objecting to claims in the government-prepared text. In Karnataka, Governor Thaawarchand Gehlot refused to address a joint sitting of the legislature, citing reservations about the content of the speech. Together, these incidents reopen fundamental questions about the presidential appointee’s role within India’s federal structure. Article 163 mandates that governors act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except in narrowly defined discretionary areas. This exception, though constitutionally sanctioned, has become the fulcrum of repeated disputes. Governors are expected to function in step with an executive accountable to the legislature, yet political alignments often unsettle this balance. What is beyond dispute is that the office was never envisaged as a parallel centre of authority operating independently of the elected government. Recent confrontations indicate that this line has been increasingly crossed.
The Supreme Court, in a series of recent rulings on governors holding up legislation, has reaffirmed that constitutional authorities are answerable to the democratic will. This judicial guidance clarifies limits, but has not eliminated friction. In the context of policy addresses, it bears reiteration that while the governor delivers the speech, its content reflects the elected government’s priorities, leaving little room for discretion. At the same time, governments would do well to avoid overt political signalling in what is intended to be a statement of policy, not partisan contestation. Contentious issues in a largely formal constitutional exercise are best resolved through dialogue and restraint, preferably away from public spectacle. When theatrics replace constitutional propriety, the immediate political gains come at the cost of federal trust.