NEW DELHI: The genesis of the present controversy over the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of voter lists in poll-bound Bihar lies in the Election Commission of India (ECI) changing a parameter for the enrollment exercise for the first time. For the longest time, any one could get into the poll rolls through self-declaration of citizenship. Deletion would kick in only if someone challenged the bona fides and produced material to establish it. The poll body has now shifted the burden of proof of citizenship to the applicant.
Rebutting challenges, the ECI in its counter affidavit in the Supreme Court said, it is "vested with the power to scrutinize whether a proposed elector fulfils the criteria for being registered as a voter in the electoral roll, which includes, inter alia, an assessment of citizenship as per Article 326 of the COI. Such scrutiny is constitutionally mandated and crystallized by virtue of RP Act 1950. This power flows directly from the provisions of Article 324 (superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the electoral rolls) read with 326 (adult suffrage), and sections 16 (disqualification if a person is not a citizen) and 19 (ordinarily a resident in a constituency entitled to be registered in the electoral roll) of the RP Act 1950.”
Supreme Court judge Surya Kant concurred. “Law regarding conferment of citizenship or taking away of citizenship will have to be enacted by the Parliament. No debate is required on that. But once that law has been made and in terms of that if somebody has been acknowledged or recognised as citizen, inclusion of that person in the voters list and a person who has not been recognised as citizen and who is not a citizen, exclusion of that person, that has to be undertaken by the commission only,” he said. He agreed that self-declaration of citizenship may lead to legal complications, adding the ECI can verify their authenticity.
Constitutional arrangement
At the time of India’s transition to a republic on 26 January 1950, the Constitution did not create a permanent, all-encompassing code of citizenship, but instead provided a transitional framework in Part II to determine who would be a citizen at that moment and vested Parliament with the authority to legislate on citizenship thereafter. Article 5 recognised as citizens those who had a domicile in the territory of India and were either born in India, had a parent born in India, or had been ordinarily resident for at least five years immediately preceding the Constitution’s commencement. Articles 6 to 8 addressed the exceptional circumstances of Partition and the Indian diaspora: Article 6 laid down conditions for migrants from Pakistan to acquire citizenship, Article 7 regulated the status of those who had migrated to Pakistan but later returned, and Article 8 provided for registration of persons of Indian origin living abroad. Article 9 prohibited dual citizenship by terminating Indian nationality upon voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship, while Articles 10 and 11 ensured the continuance of citizenship for those recognised under the preceding provisions and empowered Parliament to make laws governing its acquisition and loss. Together, these clauses fixed the original “markers” of membership—domicile, birth, descent, residence, and certain migration-linked circumstances—while deliberately delegating the future shaping of citizenship to ordinary legislation such as the Citizenship Act, 1955.
Citizenship Act, 1955
CA1955 operationalises those markers through defined routes of acquisition: by birth (section 3), by descent (section 4), by registration (section 5), by naturalisation (section 6 read with the Third Schedule), and by incorporation of territory (section 7). Over time, Parliament narrowed jus soli (right of the soil): persons born in India between 1950 and 1987 were citizens by birth; between 1987 and 2004 at least one parent had to be a citizen; on or after 3 December 2004, one parent must be a citizen and the other not an “illegal migrant”. Special provisions include section 6A (Assam Accord) and section 6B (post-CAA category), alongside detailed rules on loss and deprivation (e.g., renunciation, termination upon acquiring foreign citizenship). These statutory pathways are the operative markers today because they determine who is, and who is not, a citizen after commencement.
A key development was the Supreme Court’s October 2024 ruling upholding section 6A’s constitutionality, confirming that Parliament may craft a state-specific, time-bound regularisation consistent with equality and federal considerations. It stabilised the Assam settlement and clarified that differential regimes can pass muster if they rest on intelligible differentia and rational nexus.
CAA 2019
The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 (CAA) creates a fast-track for certain non-Muslim migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan who entered India on or before 31 December 2014, permitting naturalisation on relaxed terms and shielding them from “illegal migrant” disqualifications. After a four-plus-year gap, the Union notified the implementing Rules in March 2024. Hundreds of petitions challenged the CAA and Rules under Articles 14, 15 and 21; the Supreme Court has not decided the merits, but on 19 March 2024 it refused to stay the Rules, sought detailed responses from the Union, and listed the matter for further hearing. That is a procedural stance, not a final endorsement of validity.
Recent case-specific orders also show the court’s emphasis on statutory cut-offs. In June 2025, the Supreme Court dismissed the plea of a Pakistani Christian who sought citizenship despite arriving in India after the CAA’s cut-off, underscoring that, unless the statute is struck down, temporal limits control eligibility.
Markers versus proofs
Citizenship is a status fixed by law; documents are evidence of that status for particular administrative or judicial contexts. No single identity document is universally conclusive. The Supreme Court’s ongoing hearings on Bihar’s SIR make this plain. The bench agreed with the Election Commission of India that Aadhaar is not proof of citizenship and, even as proof of residence/identity, is not conclusive. Simultaneously, the court called the SIR’s expanded document list “voter-friendly”, signalling inclusion without treating any one ID as conclusive.
Multiple reports converge on two propositions: (a) Aadhaar and ration cards cannot be treated as conclusive proof of residence or citizenship; and (b) allowing a wider suite of documents is less restrictive than a tight list, provided verification is robust. This approach aligns with the basic evidentiary idea that documentary weight is contextual, not absolute.
So what counts as “proof of citizenship” in practice?
For strict legal proof of citizenship, the most authoritative documents are: (i) an Indian passport (issued only to citizens); (ii) a birth certificate which, read with section 3’s parentage/date rules, establishes citizenship by birth; (iii) a certificate of registration or naturalisation issued under sections 5/6; and (iv) an order or certificate under section 6A or section 6B where applicable. Other records—name on the electoral roll and the EPIC card, school and hospital records, land or tenancy records, government service documents, and long-term residence proofs—can corroborate but generally do not themselves confer citizenship. Legal explainers and reportage consistently reflect this hierarchy and caution against treating Aadhaar or PAN as nationality documents.
It is also important to distinguish civil registration and identity regimes from nationality law. The UIDAI’s documentation lists what suffices as proof of identity, address and date-of-birth for Aadhaar enrolment and updates; starting 1 October 2023, a birth certificate is mandatory for those born thereafter. That rule may improve record-keeping, but it does not convert Aadhaar into a nationality document, nor does it make a birth certificate by itself a guarantee of citizenship where statutory disqualifications (e.g., a parent classified as an “illegal migrant” after 2004) apply.
Equality, secularism, administrative feasibility
On the constitutional plane, the CAA challenges focus on whether religion-based classification fails Article 14’s reasonable-classification test or violates the secular character implicit in the Constitution. Petitioners argue similarly situated migrants are treated unequally on religious grounds; the Union argues the line tracks persecution in specific theocratic neighbours and is thus a narrow, intelligible response. The Supreme Court Observer’s briefing outlines these questions, while CRS and other primers summarise the policy background; critically, the court has kept the Rules in force during adjudication but has not yet ruled on merits.
Administratively, the Bihar SIR shows the risks of wrongful exclusion/inclusion. By rejecting Aadhaar as conclusive and welcoming multiple documents plus transparency and objections, the court aims to protect the franchise while keeping citizenship status a question of law under CA1955.
Practical guidance
Individuals should keep: birth certificates (plus parents’ status at birth), passports and prior files, certificates of registration/naturalisation, any section 6A/6B orders, and corroborative records (electoral roll, school and residence records). Administrators should apply a multi-document, transparent process with reasoned exclusions and avenues for objection/appeal, recognising that CA1955—and binding precedent—fixes status while ID systems merely evidence it.
The bottom line
India’s citizenship architecture is layered: the Constitution supplies the original membership rules and parliamentary power; CA1955 supplies acquisition, loss, and special tracks (notably section 6A and the CAA pathway); and contemporary litigation polices equality and due process at the margins. The Supreme Court’s latest observations do not decide the CAA’s fate, but they do clarify evidence law in adjacent processes: Aadhaar is not proof of citizenship, expanded document lists can be citizen-friendly if verified, and statutory cut-offs govern unless and until the court rules otherwise. That is why, in practice, passports, birth-cum-parentage proof, and registration/naturalisation or section 6A/6B certificates remain the strongest proofs—while other IDs play corroborative roles.