On January 28, 2026, a little after 08:45 am, a tragic air accident occurred when a chartered Learjet 45XR attempted to land at Baramati Airport in Maharashtra. The crash led to the death of all people on board, including Deputy Chief Minister Ajit Pawar. This has shocked Maharashtra and the rest of the nation and raised serious questions about aviation safety in the country.
The aircraft involved was a Learjet 45XR, manufactured by Bombardier Aerospace. This is a light business jet used for corporate and charter flights. It usually carries eight to nine passengers and flies at around 450 knots at cruise altitude.
The Learjet 45XR is fully capable of flying under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), meaning it can safely operate using instruments even when visibility is poor. The aircraft is equipped with modern systems such as a Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation, flight management systems, autopilot, and navigation computers. In simple terms, the aircraft itself was technically capable of handling bad weather.
However, safety does not depend only on the aircraft. It also depends heavily on whether the airport is properly equipped.
Baramati Airport does not have a certified Instrument Landing System and does not have full Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) landing capability. Like many small airports in India, it works mainly under Visual Flight Rules (VFR).
Under VFR, pilots are legally required to see the runway clearly before continuing the landing. Normally this requires at least five-kilometre-long visibility and clear visual contact with runway lights and markings. If these conditions are not met, the landing should not continue.
When visibility is poor, pilots cannot clearly see the runway, the threshold, or the correct touchdown point. At airports with proper IFR systems like Instrument Landing System or satellite-based precision approaches, an aircraft can safely follow electronic guidance down to a defined height.
But at airports without such systems, pilots must depend on limited guidance and then transition to visual judgment near the ground. This increases workload and risk, especially in bad weather.
Reports indicate that during the approach, the pilot Captain Sumit Kapoor said the aircraft was 'drifting heavily to the right', which strongly suggests strong crosswind. Crosswind means the wind is blowing from the side of the runway. This makes it difficult to keep the aircraft aligned with the runway centerline.
Light business jets like the Learjet have crosswind limits, usually around 20–30 knots. Beyond this, landing becomes increasingly difficult. If the aircraft cannot remain stable, the correct safety action is to go around and attempt again or divert to another airport.
The risk becomes much higher when the runway is a table-top runway like it was at Baramati (about 2000 feet above mean sea level). A table-top runway is built on elevated land, with steep drops at both ends. There is no safety margin if the aircraft lands short or goes beyond the runway.
Such runways also create visual illusion, especially in rain, fog, or poor light, making it harder for pilots to judge height and distance correctly. India has already seen serious accidents on such runways at Mangalore (2010) and Karipur/Calicut (2020).
There are indications that the aircraft may not have been on the correct glide path during final approach. A proper landing requires a stabilized approach, meaning the aircraft must be correctly aligned, at the correct speed, and descending at the correct angle by about 1,000 feet above ground. If the aircraft comes in too low, it can touch the ground before the runway. This is called an undershoot.
Undershoot often happens when visibility is poor and the pilot loses accurate judgment of height and distance. The fact that two landing attempts were made shows that conditions were already difficult. In such situations, diversion to another airport is always a safe and acceptable decision.
This accident also brings attention to the use of GAGAN, which stands for GPS-Aided Geo Augmented Navigation. GAGAN is India's satellite-based navigation system that improves the accuracy of GPS signals. It can provide very accurate guidance to pilots during approach and landing, even at airports without ILS. It is extremely useful for short runways, smaller airports, and airports in difficult terrain.
GAGAN can help pilots maintain a stable descent and reduce the risk of undershoot or loss of control in poor visibility. Despite its benefits, GAGAN approaches are still not mandatory at many smaller or high-risk airports, which is a serious missed safety opportunity. It is learned that Learjet 45 that met with the accident was not fitted with GAGAN.
This reflects a wider problem: lack of proactive action by the regulator. After the Mangalore and Karipur accidents, one would expect stronger nationwide rules for table-top airports, mandatory advanced landing systems, and stricter operating limits. But this has not happened in a systematic way.
The same pattern has been seen before.
In the Air India Boeing 787 fuel control switch issue, the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had issued advisories recommending specific checks of fuel control switches after international safety concerns. A strong regulator would have ensured immediate and strict compliance across all Indian operators. Instead, enforcement appeared slow and weak.
Similarly, in the IndiGo operational incidents, regulatory action came only after repeated problems became public, rather than acting early to prevent risk. These examples show a regulator that often reacts after incidents, not before.
A serious structural issue is the leadership of the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA). The DGCA is largely headed by generalist bureaucrats, not aviation professionals. Some recent senior leaders have academic backgrounds such as humanities and long administrative careers, but no professional experience in flying, aircraft engineering, air traffic control, or aviation safety systems. Aviation is a highly technical field. Without deep domain knowledge at the top, regulation often becomes paperwork-based instead of safety-driven.
This is very different from international practice. In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is led by professionals with real aviation background. The current FAA chief, Bryan Bedford, has more than three decades of aviation industry experience, including airline leadership roles, and he also holds a pilot licence.
In the United Kingdom, the aviation regulator is the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). Its Chief Executive, Rob Bishton, is a trained commercial pilot with extensive experience in airline operations, including flying large aircraft like the Boeing 787. These regulators are led by people who understand aviation from inside the cockpit and the control room, not just from files.
This accident should therefore not be seen as a single failure of a crew or a single airport. It highlights larger systemic weaknesses: lack of advanced landing systems at smaller airports, heavy dependence on Visual Flight Rules operations even when conditions are marginal, slow adoption of systems like GAGAN, weak proactive regulation, and absence of aviation professionals at the top of the regulatory structure.
If India is serious about improving aviation safety, it must modernise airport infrastructure, mandate advanced navigation systems at vulnerable airports, and most importantly, restructure the DGCA so that it is led by experienced aviation professionals rather than only general administrators. In aviation, safety depends on technical understanding, not on paperwork. It's time appointments in crucial positions are done keeping this understanding in mind.
(Wing Commander A Mahesh (Retd) was a flight engineer with IAF and is a keen follower of the latest developments in the aviation industry.)