NEW DELHI: In recent years, South Asia has been rocked by youth-led protests that have upended long-standing political orders and forced major regime changes.
From Bangladesh’s massive student-led revolt in 2024 against entrenched nepotism and authoritarian streaks of the government in power to Nepal’s Gen Z uprising in September 2025 triggered by a social media ban, many young people across the region have channelled their deep-seated frustrations over economic stagnation, corruption, lack of opportunities and political exclusion.
These movements might echo the spirit of the Arab Spring of 2010–2011, when youth-driven pro-democracy uprisings swept across the Middle East and North Africa that led to the collapse of many authoritarian regimes and raised hope for major changes.
However, South Asia’s youth protests unfold within unique political, social and economic contexts. They are certainly interconnected through social platforms, face powerful political dynasties and entrenched elites with stranglehold in their societies. These mobilisations certainly reveal a generational reckoning and a firm rejection of privilege and call for transparent governance, equal opportunities, and dignity.
While Bangladesh and Nepal have seen direct regime impacts, there would be certain ripple effects in other countries in the region with similar socio-economic conditions.
Meanwhile, such uprisings highlight a crucial shift. South Asia’s youth are emerging as a powerful political force, demanding a new social contract that addresses issues that matter to them such as inequality, corruption, and exclusion within their fragile and fledgling democracies that have dented their hopes for a brighter future.
Here, we explore the key factors that drove youth movements in Bangladesh and Nepal, trying to draw comparisons with the Arab Spring, and examine what these uprisings mean for India, the biggest country of South Asia and its biggest economy.
The spark and the fury: Bangladesh and Nepal’s youth movements
In July 2024, Bangladesh witnessed one of its most explosive student-led protests in many decades. The immediate trigger was their opposition to a 30% civil service quota for descendants of 1971 Liberation War veterans -- a policy widely criticised as institutionalised nepotism by the Sheikh Hasina government.
What began as a movement against certain privilege handed by the regime quickly escalated into a broader revolt against Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her ruling Awami League, which has dominated Bangladeshi politics for over a decade while effectively sidelining the opposition forces.
Unlike other regional uprisings that target the entire political class, Bangladesh’s youth anger was almost laser-focused on Hasina. This perhaps comes from a perception that no viable opposition remained, as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) had been systematically weakened.
However, some observers did not rule out a deeper political conspiracy behind the uprising. With the rival BNP led by Khaleda Zia still lurking in the shadows, speculation swirled about the role of Pakistan’s intelligence agency ISI, which has long been accused of trying to stoke political instability in Bangladesh.
The involvement of the student wing of the banned Jamaat-e-Islami added another layer to this narrative, while the Awami League itself hinted at possible American interference. Despite a brutal crackdown that reportedly killed over 1,000 protesters, the movement gained strength and forced Hasina to flee the country.
In Nepal, the uprising of September 2025 followed a different trajectory but was driven by similar youth frustrations. The government’s abrupt ban on 26 social media platforms triggered immediate backlash, widely seen as an authoritarian attack on free speech. Generation Z students led the protests, leveraging TikTok, VPNs, and messaging platforms to organise rallies in many parts of the country. Their slogan, “Rise up from every village, rise up from every town,” captured the intent of the rebellion. Violent crackdowns followed, resulting in dozens of deaths and the resignation of Prime Minister K P Sharma Oli in no time.
Despite certain differences, both Bangladesh and Nepal’s youth uprisings underscore a common trend. They felt politically alienated and economically sidelined. But digitally empowered young people were determined to fight elite privilege, corruption and authoritarian drift. In Bangladesh, the movement targeted an entrenched ruling party and in Nepal, it rejected an entire political order. Put together, they signal a generational awakening in South Asia’s two fragile democracies that could reshape the region’s political landscape in the years to come.
Both uprisings reveal a deep and growing discontent among the youth who face economic uncertainty, job scarcity and political exclusion. While Bangladesh’s movement zeroed in on the government in power, Nepal’s protests represented a broader challenge to a dysfunctional political system marked by corruption and authoritarian tendencies. Together, these youth-led movements highlight a critical regional moment, one in which the demands for transparency, fairness, and democratic renewal are forced to be heard.
A year on, Bangladesh’s economic woes remain unchanged. Can Nepal be a different story?
Across Bangladesh and Nepal, youth-led unrest has been triggered by a common set of drivers such as economic despair, political disenchantment, and growing digital connectivity. Despite Bangladesh’s relatively stronger economic growth under Hasina, compared to Nepal’s economy, both countries face alarmingly high youth unemployment.
Educated youth face a stagnant job market, and a lack of meaningful opportunities pushed frustration to come out in the open. Political systems viewed as dynastic, corrupt, and self-serving have only deepened public disillusionment.
Digital platforms have transformed how this frustration is expressed. In Bangladesh, protesters last year flooded social media with red profile pictures on Facebook and WhatsApp, a symbol of their solidarity and defiance. In Nepal, platforms like TikTok and encrypted apps were critical tools for organising protests in the face of government surveillance and censorship. This convergence of the economically marginalised but digitally empowered youth is proving volatile. Protesters also have ranged from job-seeking graduates to garment workers and balloon sellers, unified in their demand for dignity, opportunity, and systemic change.
But while Nepal’s political trajectory remains uncertain, Bangladesh’s economic reality has seen little improvement even after a year under an interim government. There seems no meaningful focus on the economic pressures facing ordinary people as politics continues to dominate the agenda.
According to the International Labour Organization, around 30% of Bangladeshi youth are not in employment, education, or training. Among young women, unemployment stands at 23%, as against 15% for young men. Opportunities for women remain largely confined to government, NGOs, and the education sector, where career progression is often limited.
The structural issues too remain unresolved. In 2024, the government offered just 18,000 jobs against more than 2 million new entrants to the job market annually.
Nepal continues to face a growing youth employment crisis. In 2024, the unemployment rate for those aged 15–24 stood at 20.8%, according to the World Bank, pushing many young people to leave the country in search of work. But most of the jobs they find abroad are low-paid.
Remittances now account for 33.1% of Nepal’s GDP, a figure that has steadily increased over the past three decades. This heavy reliance on foreign employment highlights the lack of stable and meaningful job opportunities for young people at home.
Sri Lanka's Aragalaya
Sri Lanka too experienced a momentous political transformation, rooted in a deep economic crisis where the youth played its part in getting the Rajapaksa family out of power. While mass protests in Colombo captured international attention, the first signs of unrest emerged earlier, in the rural heartlands.
In 2021, the government abruptly banned chemical fertilisers and pesticides, initially framed as a step toward organic farming. This decision, however, severely impacted rice and tea production, two vital sectors that employed over 30% of the population and depended heavily on state subsidies. Many saw the ban as a cost-cutting measure aimed at reducing the budget deficit.
This perhaps could ignite the broader protest movement against the corruption and nepotism known as Aragalaya (“struggle”) in 2022, which was driven in large part by the youth. Their demands for accountability and “system change” led to the ousting of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and, eventually, the 2024 election of the NPP government to power.
Echoes of Arab Spring
The South Asian uprisings bear notable similarities to the Arab Spring, which began in Tunisia in 2010 with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi and quickly spread across the Middle East and North Africa. Both movements were largely driven by youth frustrated with unemployment, corruption, and authoritarian rule. Both leveraged digital tools and social media to organise and broadcast their dissent globally.
However, there are key differences. The Arab Spring was marked by a wave of authoritarian regime collapses, but also prolonged violent conflicts and civil wars, particularly in Libya and Syria. In contrast, the Bangladesh and Nepal protests, while occasionally violent, have primarily focused on mass mobilisation and direct political pressure leading to regime change or significant government concessions.
Another distinction lies in the role of established political parties. In Egypt and Tunisia, youth movements were decentralised and fragmented, often struggling to consolidate power against organised opposition parties. South Asian youth movements, particularly in Nepal, face similar challenges as entrenched political parties attempt to co-opt or suppress their demands.
Looking back, the Arab Spring delivered only modest political and economic gains for parts of the region, while unleashing widespread violence, displacement, and deeper repression elsewhere. The uprisings began as largely spontaneous, leaderless movements, focused narrowly on toppling authoritarian rulers. But once those regimes fell, there was no clear vision, structure, or unity on how to rebuild largely because governance across the Arab world was fundamentally flawed.
Decades of authoritarian rule had also eliminated any credible opposition, leaving a vacuum. That void was quickly filled by either Islamist groups, many of whom had long operated through underground networks, or by the military, both not suited for democratic reform.
Foreign powers with vested interests further complicated the landscape. Western governments vacillated between supporting democratic aspirations and protecting the status quo. Their selective interventions often reflected their own strategic interests more than their proclaimed democratic values.
What this means for India: A strategic wake-up call
Nepal has become the third country in India's immediate neighbourhood to experience a violent uprising that has led to the fall of its government in recent years following Sri Lanka in 2022 and Bangladesh in 2024. The resignation of Prime Minister K P Sharma Oli is certainly a moment of strategic concern for India.
What’s unfolding in Kathmandu is not just another political crisis in South Asia. For India, it is deeply consequential. India’s relationship with Nepal is unique, rooted in a combination of geography, culture, religion and security. Nepal shares a 1,750 km-long open border with India, connecting directly with five Indian states, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Sikkim and West Bengal. This porous frontier allows for visa-free movement of people, with an estimated 3.5 million Nepali citizens living or working in India. Under the 1950 India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Nepalis enjoy near-equal rights in India, making them the only foreign nationals alongside Bhutanese to have such privileges.
The unrest in Nepal, therefore, carries immediate implications for India. It raises concerns about border security. Any sustained instability in Nepal could result in an influx of people across the open border. Any continuing volatile situation may disrupt trade and transit routes.
Nepal is heavily dependent on India for essential imports such as fuel, food, and medicines. Annual bilateral trade stands at $8.5 billion, with India holding a very dominant position. Political turmoil can derail logistics, strain supply chains, and fuel anti-India sentiments if the public perceives Delhi as indifferent towards the needs of the people.
The Western Theatre Command of the Chinese military sits just across Nepal’s northern border. Beijing has steadily increased its footprint in Nepal through infrastructure projects, financial aid, and diplomatic overtures. Prime Minister Narendra Modi posted a statement expressing grief over the loss of lives in Nepal.
India must now pivot to proactive diplomacy and people-centered engagement. The political vacuum in Nepal is not just about failed leadership but reflects a deep crisis of legitimacy and governance, especially among the youth, who feel ignored by traditional political structures. This is a demographic India can’t afford to alienate.
With deep people-to-people ties, including over 32,000 Nepali Gurkhas serving in the Indian Army, and thousands of Indian pilgrims visiting Nepal’s sacred sites, any shift in public sentiment in Nepal inevitably reverberates across the border.
India’s strategic response should focus on all tracks. Political engagement with Nepal’s emerging leadership is imperative to ensure continued cooperation and address all sensitive issues — as a willing partner, not sounding like a patron. India must step up public diplomacy and youth outreach, including scholarships, cultural exchanges, and digital collaboration, to counter anti-India narratives and build goodwill.
Nepal’s crisis is a symptom of a broader regional trend of frustrated, digitally connected youth rising against stagnant, corrupt political orders. For India, which aspires to be the region’s stabilising power as a tested democracy, this is both a challenge and an opportunity.